Earl W. Wilson and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, Roberta Barney, and Beverly Barney : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1948
Earl W. Wilson and Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company v. The Industrial Commission
of Utah, Roberta Barney, and Beverly Barney : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grover A. Giles; Attorney General; C. N. Ottosen; Assistant Attorney General;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wilson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 7191 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/898
t. 7:191 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EARL W. WILSON, doing business as 
Wilson's Used Cars and HARTF'ORD 
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL CO·MMISSION OF 
UTAH, ROBERTA BARNEY, widow, 
and BE \T E R L Y BARNEY, minor 
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased, 
Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
GROIVER A. GILES, 
Case No. 
E 
~torney Genef1a.l 
11 I· L 1c~~TOSEN, 
.I. • ' Ass~stant Attorney General (' ':: 1- 194& At~o:rneys for Defendants 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E.A.RL W. WILSON, doing business as 
Wilson's Used Cars and HARTFORD 
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDl~"STRIAL COM~IISSION OF 
UTAH, ROBERTA BARNEY, widow, 
and BE\TERLY BARNEY, minor 
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased, 
Defendants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OiF FAC·T 
Case No. 
The Respondents deem it advisable to amplify the 
Statement of Facts set out by the Appellants in their 
brief. The Appellants have called to your attention the 
basic. facts around which this case revolves itself, and 
repetition thereof is unnecessary herein. But said Appel-
lant's Statement of Facts is incomplete relative to cer-
tain in1portant details pertaining to the nature of the 
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decedent's work and his employment status on the morn-
ing of January 9, 1947, at which time he suffered his 
fatal injuries. The Appellant's Statement of Facts is 
' therefore, adopted except as is denied, explained or 
added to in the following. The employment of Frank 
l~arney, the deceased, with Earl W. Wilson, the employer 
herein, was intermittent (Tr. 7). Barney had not been 
a regular etnployee on a monthly salary and his hours of 
work varied ( Tr. 13-27). Barney was used in different 
eapacities, as foreman, mechanic and as a salesman CTr. 
8). He workeu at different places because Wilson had 
shops in Salt Lake, Ogden and Magna, Utah and Phoenix, 
.. A.rizona ( T r. 8). Barney was allowed to arrange his work 
as he saw fit (Tr. 25 ), and Wilson usually gave no speci-
fic orders to Barney (Tr. 2, 3), but Barney was supposed 
to be on the job at 8 A.M. and was to work until 5 P.M. 
(Tr. 10, 11, 23, 25, 28, 35, 36), leaving Barney to regulate 
within those hours, his own time and do the work n1ost 
needed to be done. For about three days prior to the 
fatal accident, Barney had been working in Magna, get-
ting the Magna shop in operation. But Wilson, in his 
testimony, again emphasized that Barney was more or 
less on his own and as far as Wilson lmew, the work 
Barney had been doing at Magna was just setting the 
shop in order to get it going (Tr. 15). Barney's work 
was connected with all the other places that Wilson had 
in operation (Tr. 9, 10, 23, 26, 27, 39). 
On the morning of the fatal accident, Barney and 
a Mr. Reed .Allen Foote, left Salt Salt City in Foote's 
automobile at about 8:00 (Tr. 30) for Magna, Utah. 
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The fatal accident orcurred at about ~ :lj ~\.11. Ba1·Ht~y 
,ya8 supposed to be 'vorking in 8alt Lake City on that 
daY but "-as being sent to .Jlagna to pick up an auto-
m~bile. He \\-as then to return to Salt I. .. ake a~ soon as 
possible "ith the automobile and to pick up his work 
according to his assignment in Salt Lake. Barney wasn't 
even required or expected to report for work at Magna 
(Tr. 27, 28, 29) but merely, as stated above, to get the 
car and then report for work in Salt Lake .. A ..s has been 
pointed out, \Vilson usually gave no orders to Barney 
as to the work he should do ( Tr. 23) but on this particular 
occasion, \\~ilson had given Barney specific orders to go 
to Magna for this automobile, as indicated above. Barney 
had received these orders the night before at \\:ilson 's 
home, and 'Yas fulfilling the specific orders at the tim·e 
of his fa tal injury ( Tr. 18, 23, 24). It had been planned 
and 'vas the usual custom that Barney was to take or 
'vould have taken his employer's wrecker to Magna to 
pick up this automobile, but the 'vrecker was out of 
repair on this particular day; therefore, Barney was 
left to seek his own transportation to :lliagna. He rode 
to niagna with :Jir. Foote, 'vho is a mechanic, regularly 
assigned to that shop (Tr. 9, 10). 
ARGUMEN·T 
The sole question before this court is whether or not 
Frank Barney, the deceased, sustained an injury arising 
out of or in the course of his employment with Earl W. 
\\Tilson on the 9th day of January, 1947. The Appellants 
haYr very· thoroughly discussed the general rule rela-
tin• to this matter, namely, that an injury sustained by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
an einployee, while going to or returning from work, 
generally does not arise out of or in the course of his 
e1n ploy1nent and that no compensation can be paid there-
for. Iiespondents concede that this is the general rule 
and that it is very thoroughly supported by the authori-
tieH. rl,he Appellants further, in their brief, point out the 
exceptions to this rule and attempt to show that the case 
before the court does not come under any of these so-
called exceptions. The Respondents respectfully submit 
that the case now before the court does come, and is very 
definitely to be identified with the exception to the gen-
eral rule, kno\vn as the special mission or special errand 
doctrine. 
May we briefly review the facts. Barney, as well as 
all other employees of Wilson, were ''supposed to he on 
the job'' from 8 :00 in the morning to 5 :00 in the evening. 
Barney's fatal accident occurred on company time. Bar-
ney ordinarily had no special assignments but was left 
to his own good judgment as to where he was needed 
the most, and on the day in question he· was supposed to 
be working in the Salt Lake City shop but, as the evi-
dence shows, he did not report at the Salt Lake shop for 
the si1nple reason that he was sent on a special errand as 
a preliminary to the work he was supposed to do in Salt 
Lake City. It is especially noteworthy that at this parti-
cular time, Barney was not just doing regular or routine 
'vork but was under specific orders, and that had he not 
been sent on, and had he not been required to do, this 
particular errand, he would have been in the Salt Lake 
City Shop. ·Barney was fulfiiiing this mission according 
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to his orders. He connuenced this errand ut tho beginning· 
of his "\Yorking day and "·ns injured after this Prrand had 
been started. 
Barney received his orders the night befort), hut thi:-; 
certainly does not 1uake, nor. could it n1ake. the ~ligh tt'st 
difference in Barney's e1uployn1ent status. 'rht' que~tion 
of ,vhether or not an employee is on a special errand ha~ 
no material connection with \vhen the orders n1ight have 
been given, especially if the orders are being properly 
fulfilled as to time and manner. It is also notewortl1y to 
point out that if the wrecker had been in repair, Barney 
would ha.ve been using company equipment on company 
time. It was a mere coincidence that the wrecker was not 
being used by Barney that morning. It is also important 
to note that Wilson had not provided any special means 
of transportation and that by not doing so, he certainly 
sanctioned and approved 'vhatever means of transporta-
tion Barney might select or find available. Certainly the 
intention of the employer, as to the employ1nent status 
Barney should occupy that morning and the fact that he 
should be and was sent on a special errand, is not changed 
by the fact that the wrecker was out of repair. Barney's 
"?ork that had been regular or routine (if such a label can 
be attached to the work he was doing) had been for the 
last three days prior to the accident, to get the Magna 
shop in operation. This work was now at an end. On the 
day of the injury, Barney was not doing this work at 
~{agna. but had been given a new assignment and waH 
on a special trip to perform a special function which 
had been ordered by his employer. Barney wasn't even 
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supposed to report to work at Magna that morning, which 
statement was made by the employer, and certainly em-
phasizes the fact of a special errand assigned to Barney. 
Had this accident occurred off company hours and had 
Barney been merely on his way to do regular work, he no 
doubt would have been in a much different situation. But 
we do not have, in this case, those circumstances to con-
tend with. Barney was on company time, under special 
orders; his movements were under the control and juris-
diction of Wilson and Barney's primary, if not exclusive 
purpose in being on the road to Magna, was to fulfill this 
particular mission or errand. 
The leading case in Utah in which our Supreme Court 
has made a ruling on the special mission or special errand 
doctrine is the case of Kahn Brothers Co. vs.· Industrial 
Commission, 75 Utah 145, 283 Pac. 1054. On page 147 of 
the Utah Reports, our Supreme Court states as follows: 
It is a general rule that injuries sustained 
while an employee is traveling to and from his 
place of employment are not compensable. An ex-
ception to this rule, however, is where an em-
ployee, either on his employer's or his own time, 
is upon some substantial mission for the employer 
growing out of his employment. In such cases the 
employee is within the provision of the act. The 
mission for the employer must be the major factor 
in the journey or movement and not merely in-
cidental thereto. The precise question for deci-
sion therefore is, was applicant in the course of 
execution of an errand or special mission on be-
half of the employer at the time he suffered the 
accident. If he was the award must be sustained.'' 
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In the Kahn case the applicant was a bookkeeper and 
frequently did upto"\vn business for his employer. He also 
frequently went ho1ne for lunch and did assigned work 
for his en1ployer, son1etin1e on his \\Tay hom·e and some-
time while returning from lunch. The injury in ques-
tion in that case occurred while he was returning from 
lunch and "\Yas on his way to the post office on an errand 
for his employer. 
This special mission theory is also discussed in an-
other Utah case, namely, The Vitagraph Inc. vs. The In-
dustrial Commission, 96 Utah 190, 85 Pac. (2d) 601. Our 
court's statement relative to this theory is quoted by the 
Appellants on page 14 of their brief, which "\Ve hereby in-
corporate and to which we refer the court. 
Our Utah Court further passed upon this theory in 
the case of Chandler vs. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 
387, 208 Pac. 499. In that case the decedent was a de-
livery boy. His hours of labor were from 7 :00 in the 
morning until 6 :00 in the evening. On the morning of his 
injury he had left home to go directly to the garage of 
his employer to get the delivery truck. This was part of 
his assigned duties. On his way to the garage, slightly 
after 7 :00 A.M., he was injured so that death resulted. 
In that case our Supreme Court stated as follows: 
'' . . . If instead of going directly to the 
garage, Chandler had gone to his employer's place 
of business, and, upon his arrival there, had been 
ordered to go to the garage for the purpose of ob-
taining his delivery car and for the purpose of 
supervising the p~reparation of the other cars for 
their drivers, the case would clearly come within 
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one of the well-recognized exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that an employee injured while on his 
way to work and before he has received his place 
of work does not come under the protection of the 
Compensation Act. He took the direct route to 
the garage during working hours, and, at the very 
time he vvas bitten by the dog, he was engaged in 
the furtherance of his employer's business and 
not on an errand of his own. He was obeying the 
order of his employer, the order to proceed to 
the garage for the purpose of attending to his 
duties there. He was under the control and direc-
tion of his employer from the moment he left home 
to go to the garage for the automobile, and was 
at that time in the course of, and within the scope 
of, his employment. His death resulting from the 
accident is therefore compensable." 
Another leading case frequently re{erred to, is the 
case of· I_.jondon Guaranty & Accident Co. vs. Industrial 
Accident Comn1ission, (Calif.) 213 Pac. 977. In that case 
the California Snprerne Court referred to the exception 
now being discussed, in the following terms : 
'' ... Exceptions to the general rule are cases 
\Vhcre an e1nployee, either in his employer's or hi~ 
O\Vn time, is going to or from his place of enlplo~·­
ment on some substantial1nission for his employer 
gro\ving out of his employment. In such cases it 
is held that the employee is within the protection 
of the act. But the mission must be the major 
factor in the journey or movernent, and not merely 
incidental thereto~ that is to say, if incidental to 
the rnain purpose of going to or from the place 
of ernplo)J.nent, jt \vonld not bring such person 
under the protection of the act. If, on the other 
hand, the 1nain purpose of going or coming was to 
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he would be under the protection of the act, al-
though incident to the perforrnance of such duty, 
he might be going or corning from his home.'' 
The above rule from the California case has fre-
quently been used to assist in deterrnining whether or not 
a person is in the course of his employment at the thne 
of injury. ~-\s this rule frorn the California court 1nay be 
applied to the case before the court, we desire to point 
out that Barney, the deceased, was on a ''substantial 
mission'' for his employer. 'The particular assignment 
or mission of Barney was the "major factor" of his go-
ing to ~[agna. Barney \vas going to l\1agna for no other 
purpose than to perform that one errand. This assigned 
errand was not incidental to his employment at that time, 
but was the exclusive reason for the trip. 
We desire further to call this court's attention to the 
case of ~,r assey vs. Board of Education (N.C.) 167 S.E. 
695. In that case the employee was a janitor. He was in-
jured on his way to work and was crossing the street to 
buy the cleaning materials which he had been instructed 
to purchase before he came to work. The North Carolina 
Supreme Court in that case stated as follows: 
''. . . While service on regular hours at a 
stated place generally begins at that place, there 
is always room for agreement by which the ser-
vice may be taken to begin earlier or elsewhere. 
Service in extra hours or on special errands has 
an element of distinction which the· employer may 
recognize by agreeing that such service shall com-
mence when the employee leaves his home on the 
duty assigned to him and shall continue until his 
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return. Any agree1nent to that effect may be either 
express or be shown by the course of business. In 
such case the hazards of the journey may properly 
be regarded as hazards of the service and hence 
within the purview of the Compensation Act." 
Another decision which is followed by the North 
Carolina case, just referred to, is the case of Kyle vs. 
Green High School (Iowa) 226 N.W. 71. This case has 
an interesting accumulation of authorities in the type of 
case now before the court. 
The Respondents further refer to the case of In Re 
Raynes (Indiana) 118 N.E. 387. In that case the employee 
was a secretary and treasurer of a corporation and in 
his routine and regular work went to various cities and 
towns to collect money. In this particular case, he had 
been sent to Terre Haute to make collections. Only a 
small part of his day was devoted to this activity. In fact, 
he stayed until late at night and indulged in various per-
sonal activities. He missed his regular train and hired a 
taxicab to take hin1 home. He was injured while on his 
way ho1ne, after alighting from the taxicab when it 
stopped for gas. In that case on page 389, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana stated as follows: 
"Raynes went to Terre Haute for the pur-
post of collecting accounts due the company. This 
staten1ent is an ultimate fact. If to collect suc.h 
accounts "\Vere his exclusive purpose, then in go-
ing to Terre Haute he was discharging the duties 
of his employment. Perhaps the same conclusion 
would follow if such was his principal purpose.'' 
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See also In Re Harraden, 118 N.E. 1-±2. 
There are nun1erous other cases \vhich deal with this 
particular theory pertaining to special missions and 
special errands, many of 'vhich deal with one or more 
of the issues and involve, in many respects, facts similar 
to those, involved in tl1e case before the court. 
\V e respectfully recommend reading the following 
cases: Altman vs. Kaufman Realty Co. (Pa.) 167 Atl. 
394; Redner vs. H. C. Faber and Sons (N.Y.) 119 N.E. 
842; City of ~Iilwaukee vs. Althoff (Wis.) 145 N.W. 
238; Trader General Insurance Co. vs. Nunley (Texas) 
80 8.,\'"". (2) 383: Industrial Commission vs. lEtna Life 
Insurance Co., (Colo.) 17 4 Pac. 589; and Reese vs. N a-
tiona! Surety Co., (Minn.) 203 N.W. 442. 
The Respondents feel that there is no conflict in the 
evidence that points to the deceased, Mr. Barney, having 
been sent on a special errand, and therefore being in the 
course of his employment when injured. On the contrary 
there is considerable evidence, relating to Mr. Barney's 
activities for, and prior to, the fatal day, pointing to an 
assignment of Barney by his employer to an exclusive 
mission to get the automobile at Magna and to bring it 
to Salt Lake City. We submit that the Commission is 
the fact finding body, is the arbiter of the facts, and that 
they made no error in ruling that Barney was in the 
course of his employment at the time of his fatal injury. 
We submit that the decision should stand because of the 
sufficiency of the evidence as above indicated, support-
ing the Commission's finding. We, therefore, urge that 
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12 
the Commission's award in the case before the court 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRO,VER A. GILES, 
.A,t,torney General 
C. N. OTTO·SEN, 
.Assistant .Attorney General 
At~o~rneys for Defenaants 
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